05 August 2013

Grasim Industries - Annual Report Highlights :: JPMorgan

GRASIM’s cash flow generation should materially pick up, in our view, as the
large capex in VSF gets completed and is commissioned over the coming
quarters. We believe at the current share price, the underlying cement assets
are at an implied value of ~$93/T. We maintain our OW rating and increase
our Jun14 PT to Rs3610.

DLF Limited - JPM

According to our discussions with property agents/brokers, DLF has launched
and significantly pre-sold its initial inventory of the high-end golf course
residential project “The Camellias”. We believe around 32 units have been
sold with ticket prices of US$3MM+ and a base selling price of Rs25K/psf.
This follows the earlier successful launch of Crest (@ Rs15K/psf). We note
that as per the annual plan laid out by the company, the target was to sell 1.7
msf p.a over the next 3-4 years. These two launches, we estimate, have taken
the sales volume to approx 1.1 msf with selling prices higher than our
assumptions. Phase 5, in our view, will increasingly become a key driver of
the company’s operating cash flow from F15 onwards.

ICICI Bank In-line results ::Credit Suisse

● ICICI 1Q14 operating profit was in line; however, reported profit
was 4% ahead on strong treasury gains. NIMs held up well at
3.3%; however, with loan growth slowing to 12% YoY, core cost
income moved up to 44%. Fee income picked-up to 9% YoY.
● Domestic loan growth (1.6% QoQ, 14% YoY) was lower than
expected as retail loan growth (Rs31 bn adj for sell downs) didn’t
pick up. However, management remains confident of achieving
18-20% retail growth for full year. We reduce overall loan growth
estimate to ~15% post RBI measures. We expect domestic NIMs
(3.6%) to moderate from current levels.
● Credit cost moved up (82 bp) as NPL additions were higher (Rs11
bn) vs earlier runrate of Rs7-8 bn. Restr’ing was at Rs8.3 bn with
a further pipeline of Rs10-11 bn. Management has maintained
credit cost guidance at ~75 bp; however, we see upside risk to it.
● Consolidated profit was at 32% YoY on better general insurance
profitability aided by treasury gains. Earnings growth is expected to
settle at 13% CAGR and with core ROE at 15%, at 1.4x core book,
maintain NEUTRAL. Cut estimate by 3-4%, reduce TP to Rs1,075.

India Power Sector Syncing the cash and growth tales :JPMorgan

We reassess our view on the power sector with a hypothesis that a stock
with assurance of profitable growth and the cash to achieve it is more
investment worthy, at the right valuation.

Dr. Reddy's -Sharp margin recovery in the US but ex-US disappointed ::Credit Suisse

● Jun-13 was a weak quarter for ex-US business on both sales and
margins. India sales growth was flattish, Russia grew 3% while
PSAI grew by just 6%. Price erosion on some APIs resulted in
PSAI margins declining from 30% avg to 19% - management
expects normalisation but the normal could have been set lower.
● Positive takeaway of the Jun-13 quarter was the sharp improvement
in gross margins of global generics (up 380 bp QoQ) despite weak
India and Russia, and hit on Lansoprazole. This was driven by
contribution of high margin Reclast and lower sales of finasteride.
● Our estimates are largely unchanged (except for 1Q14 miss) as
benefit of INR depreciation is offset by (1) lower PSAI margins (2)
higher R&D guidance of 8-9% (3) higher pricing policy impact of
Rs550mn in India vs. our expectation of Rs250-300 mn.
● We increase our TP to Rs2,420 (from Rs2,180) as we remove the
discount of 10% to its peers and value at 20x FY15E. DRL US
pipeline has improved with several limited competition approvals
lately (like Injectables) and several pending like Vidaza, Copaxone,
etc. DRL is now focusing on topicals, patches and inhalers.

Sesa & Sterlite - Q1FY14 Combined Result Update - Centrum

Power operations surprise positively,
overhangs of project delays and debt remain
For the proposed Sesa Sterlite group (expected to be in place soon),
operational performance surprised positively again on a sequential
basis with i) higher earnings from domestic zinc operations on the
back of solid 27% YoY increase in MIC volumes, ii) higher volumes
(up ~26% QoQ) from merchant power division at SEL with better
realizations at ~Rs3.5/unit, iii) lower cost performance from VAL and
better metal premiums from aluminium operations. Positive
developments were mainly from merchant power operations with
PLF guidance of 60-70% for all four units, guidance of 15% YoY
growth in mined metal output at HZL being maintained and
visibility on restart of iron ore operations of Sesa Goa at Karnataka.
We were negatively surprised by further delay in 325ktpa smelter
commissioning at BALCO along with the delay in receiving
approvals for operational startup of 1200 MW power plant and in
starting production from the captive coal block (now put off to
FY15E). We remain concerned on long term volumes and
profitability of VAL (which operates without captive assets in
bauxite and alumina and will become the 100% subsidiary of the
merged entity) and continuation of funding for VAL’s losses from
standalone operations (additional Rs50bn lent by SIIL to VAL during
the quarter). We continue to see the merger offering limited
benefits to the consolidated entity on account of its huge debt and
skewed EBITDA profile (~70% of group EBITDA comes from HZL and
Cairn whose cash fungibility does not exist with the group) and see
HZL stake buyout as a key event for the entity to have better cash
flow and stable operations.
We have used FY15E EV/EBITDA valuation (see table below) to arrive
at a SOTP fair value of Rs157 for Sesa Sterlite and corresponding fair
value of Rs94 for Sterlite (based on 0.6x Sesa Sterlite value). We
maintain our Buy rating on both the stocks with reduced target
prices. Possible stake buyout in HZL and BALCO by the group from
the GoI could lead to material upgrades in our target prices.

JK Cement - Subdued results; new projects encouraging; Buy (Anand Rathi Institutional Research)

JK Cement - Subdued results; new projects encouraging; Buy


Key takeaways
Muted grey cement performance. JK Cement’s revenues dropped 11% yoy, led by 12% yoy drop in aggregate volumes (16% in grey cement) even as realizations rose 2% yoy. Blended EBITDA per ton, at `635 (`375 in grey: `580 in the South;`290 in the North), dipped 33% yoy due to double-digit cost inflation in raw material, stores & spares and freight. Also, drop in volumes yoy led to a 35% surge in fixed cost per ton. The drop in pet-coke prices was partially offset by the higher cost of grid power. For FY14, management expects volumes to remain flat or grow marginally.
Robust growth in white cement. White cement and wall putty volumes in 1Q grew 9% and 38%, respectively, yoy; the company aims at a further 15% and 25% yoy growth in these segments in FY14. We believe this is achievable, given the company’s strong brand equity and market share (40%) and ongoing capacity expansions. EBITDA per ton came in at `2,747 (versus `2,745 a year ago and `3,077 the previous quarter). Realisation per ton rose 4% yoy (down 1% qoq), to `10,890. The business contributed 51% to overall EBITDA. The planned 0.6m-ton plant in Fujairah, UAE, is on track for completion by Mar’14; civil construction is in progress.
Rajasthan project on track. The 3m-ton grey cement project (split grinding units of 1.5 tons each in Haryana and Mangrol, Rajasthan) is on track. Grinding unit is likely to come up by Jun’14 and clinker by Sep’14. We expect high utilisation rates to continue in the plant’s core markets of North, Central regions.
Our take. 1QFY14 performance was in line with estimates. Based on the quarter trend, we have toned down our FY14-15 earnings. Our SOTP based target price of `290 is based on 7x Jun’14e EV/EBITDA (30% discount to our target multiple for large-cap cement companies) and value of investment in subsidiary. We maintain Buy on this multi-region, multi-product play. At fair value of the standalone entity, the stock would trade at PE of 9x and EV per ton of US$80. Risk. Drop in cement prices.

Thanks & Regards
Anand Rathi Institutional Research

Nomura:: Adani Port & SEZ :: Strong volume growth in a difficult macro Volumes continue to grow exceptionally well and highlight core asset quality

Action: Retain Buy on strong 1QFY14 results
Adani Port’s 1QFY14 operating performance was once again ahead of our
as well as the Street’s estimates due to higher-than-expected revenue
growth. While a large part of the revenue beat was driven by a one-off
income from the transfer of CT3 to its own JV, even on an adjusted basis
revenue was ahead of consensus estimates by 6%. Volume growth,
though, was slightly lower than our expectations, but was still up 35% y-y
at a time when other ports have been reporting a negative- to-flattish trend
at best. Too many adjustments make this quarter’s true margins difficult to
read, although we estimate that it is still likely at ~70% levels. With the
core business remaining strong, we remain positive on the stock and
expects the company to deliver ~25% earnings CAGR over FY13-15F as it
should continue to gain market share due to capacity constraints at major
ports. Further, its smaller ports (Dahej and Hazira) have also started
delivering good volumes and profits. Thus, we continue to prefer ADSEZ
as our top India infrastructure play.
Catalysts: Continued market share gain and a softer rate cycle
Continued strong momentum in traffic growth and the softer interest rate
cycle are key tailwinds for the stock, in our view.
Valuation: At ~13.0x stand-alone FY15F EPS of INR11.06, the stock
offers value; upside potential of 33%
We maintain Buy on the stock as it is trading at an attractive valuation of
13.0x stand-alone FY15F EPS of INR11.06, which is unjustified given its
strong earnings growth and ROE profile. Our TP of INR187 offers an
upside potential of 33%.

Jubilant Foodworks: Management discussion takeaways - Challenging demand environment : JPMorgan

Our recent discussions with mgmt indicate that weak macro environment is
challenging discretionary spending and the company has to resort to higher
promotions to drive growth. SSS growth trends remain fairly subdued for now,
though mgmt is hopeful of 2H recovery. Margins face downside risk from slowing
SSSG, higher promotions, lower profitability of new stores and costs related to
Dunkin’ Donuts format. Promoter shareholding has come down by 330 bps since
Jan’13 in the company. Valuations at 43x FY14E and 33x FY15E P/E appear
demanding against the backdrop of earnings downside risk. Stay UW.

Petronet LNG - Q1FY14 result update - Centrum

Lower trading/marketing margin drags earnings
Petronet LNG’s results for Q1FY14 were below our and street expectations
primarily due to sharp decline in trading/marketing margins which dragged
earnings. Capacity utilization was healthy at 102% vs. 96% in Q4FY13 and 100%
in Q1FY13. We believe that owing to weak demand for RLNG, the company had
focussed on higher capacity utilization (CU) and charged significantly lower
trading/marketing margin to enable higher off-take, which is in contrast to its
historical earnings model. We have downgraded the stock to HOLD with a
revised PT of Rs 124 primarily to factor in pressure on core earnings and lower
trading/marketing margins.
Earnings snapshot: Higher capacity utilization (CU) at 102% (+200 bps YoY and +600
bps QoQ) and higher unit sale price at Rs754 (+25% YoY and +6% QoQ) led to increase
in net sales to Rs 83.8 bn (+20% YoY and -1% QoQ). EBITDA at Rs 3.9bn (-13% YoY and -
8% QoQ) and RPAT at Rs2.3 bn (-17% YoY and -8% QoQ) was under pressure on
account of in (1) decline in trading/marketing margins at Rs 0.09 bn (-87% QoQ and
-89% YoY) and (2) increase in internal consumption of RLNG.
Trading and marketing margins: During Q1FY14, we believe PLNG earned
~Rs0.09bn (USD0.04/MMBTU) as net trading/ marketing margins, down 87% QoQ and
up 89% YoY. We remain conservative and have factored average marketing/trading
margins of USD0.2/MMBTU, although the management remains confident of pick-up
in trading /marketing margins to USD0.3/MMBTU. We believe that since RLNG price is
outside the regulatory purview, any attempt to regulate marketing/trading margins
for PLNG/GAIL and regas charges for PLNG would be challenging and hence do not
see any regulatory risk.

Summary of measures taken by RBI in 1997-98 during South East Asian financial Crisis.

RBI Policy Chronology Summary 1997-98
Period / date
RBI policy measure
Macroeconomic backdrop
Easing bias prior to South East Asian Financial Crisis
October 1997
Bank rate was reduced to 9% from 10% 
RBI promised to reduce CRR to 8% from 10% in eight tranches between October 1997 and March 1998 (estimated liquidity infusion: INR96bn) 
Interest rate to banks on CRR balances was raised from 3.5% to 4% 
Interest rate on pre-shipment export credit was reduced to 12% from 13%. Post shipment rupee credit interest rate reduced to 11% or less from 13% (both for loans less than 90days)
RBI had started monetary easing to revitalise growth following a phase of high inflation, heavy monetary tightening and a slump in growth during the mid-1990s
Stringent tightening following the South East Asian Financial Crisis
November 1997
Interest rate on post-shipment INR export credit (3-6m) was raised to 15% from 13% 
CRR cuts planned through eight tranches was deferred 
RBI announced scheme of the fixed repo rate starting at 4.5%
December 1997
CRR was raised by 50bps to 10% and Incremental CRR of 10% on NRE and NRNR was withdrawn 
Repo rate was raised in three stages during December alone to 7% from 4.5% 
Banks were required to charge a 20% interest rate on overdue export bills 
An interest rate surcharge of 15% on the lending rate imposed on bank credit for imports 
Interest rate on post-shipment INR export credit for over 90 days was reduced to 13% from 15%
January 1998
Bank rate was raised to 11% from 9% 
CRR was raised to 10.5% from 10% 
Repo rate was raised to 9% from 7% 
Export credit refinance limit was halved to 50% of the increase in outstanding export credit 
Liquidity support to primary dealers via reverse repos was made discretionary 
Interest rate surcharge on bank credits for imports was raised to 30% from 15% 
General refinance to commercial banks was reduced to 0.25% of the fortnightly average outstanding aggregate deposits in 1996-97.
Reversal of the RBI’s stringent policy stance
March– August 1998
March: Repo rate reduced to 8% from 9%. Bank rate was reduced to 10.5% from 11%. CRR was reduced to 10% from 10.5% 
April: Bank rate was reduced to 9% from 10.5% in two stages; repo rate was reduced to 6% from 8% in two stages 
Export credit refinance limit was restored to 100% (versus 50% in the recent past). 
Interest rate on pre-shipment export credit (less than six months) was reduced to 11% from 12% 
June 1998: Repo rate was reduced to 5% from 6% 
August: Resurgent India Bonds (RIBs) were floated overseas targeting the Indian diaspora by the State Bank of India – raises USD4.2bn in three currencies (USD, GBP, DM). This turned out to be a meaningful accretion to the nation’s forex reserve pool and eventually offered good support to the INR trajectory
Reversal of monetary policy measures announced to contain effects of South East Asian currency crisis. Stability had returned to currency market and liquidity conditions eased



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Myth of ‘guaranteed’ returns:: Business Line

In recent years we have been rather complacent about our financial markets. Whatever else may be wrong with our economy or government, we thought, our financial markets, with their state-of-the-art trading systems and hyper-active regulators, were surely immune to crisis.
No-man’s land
But the trading halt and suspended contracts at National Spot Exchange (NSEL) this week have turned this notion on its head. This controversy brings to light how an entire exchange (which recorded a Rs 3 lakh crore turnover last fiscal) was functioning in a no-man’s land, with neither the Forward Markets Commission nor any other regulator taking active responsibility for it. Given that some of these contracts were on obscure commodities without a clear benchmark price, brokers and speculators made merry by roping in high net-worth investors and offering them ‘assured returns’ from punting on such commodities as raw wool and castor-seed. While the going was good, investors made their money. But when regulators belatedly took note, the exchange was thrown into a payments crisis and called a halt to trading. This has reportedly left many affluent investors, who had taken positions on the exchange via their brokers, in the lurch.
While this episode should lead to some soul-searching for the regulators, what about the lessons for investors? There are many.
Lure of fixed returns
The first is that Indian investors, who are the soul of conservatism when it comes to financial products such as equities or bonds, seem to throw caution to the winds whenever anyone mentions a ‘guaranteed’ return. It was the ‘assured’ returns of 15 per cent (annually) that led affluent investors to lend money to traders in the NSEL for punting on obscure commodities that they neither tracked nor understood.
It was also very similar ‘guaranteed’ returns that prompted others to park money in the Sahara real estate firms’ convertible bonds. It was similar projections that prompted investors to flock to plantation schemes and emu farms without asking too many questions. Investors avoid equity and mutual fund products like plague because they offer only market-linked returns, which they know are subject to fluctuations. SEBI too bars equity and mutual fund players from offering any assured return even on fairly predictable products such as Fixed Maturity Plans.
But the same investors seem to assume that any product that holds out ‘fixed’ returns, even by way of verbal assurances, is automatically risk-free.
Guarantee checklist
It is time investors realised that the regulated but market-linked products are much safer than ‘assured return’ products that function in a regulatory vacuum. After all, the promise of fixed returns from a broker, fund-raiser or middleman means practically nothing, unless you know where the returns are going to come from.
So the questions investors need to ask of every such scheme is: How is this scheme hoping to make money? Is there really a legitimate market capable of generating a fixed 15-20 per cent return on a sustainable basis? If so, why haven’t professional investors such as Rakesh Jhunjhunwala or your mutual fund caught on to it already? If the scheme to trade in wool, build a resort or grow emus doesn’t live up to its potential, does the guarantor have a back-up plan to deliver the assured returns? If he says he has, do his financials support it? And if he reneges on his promise, who is the regulator you can complain to? As long as these questions are unanswered, any ‘guarantee’ isn’t worth the paper it is printed on.
Exchange troubles
Of course, the NSEL saga also exposes the fragility of another business that everyone thought was a sure money-spinner — the business of operating a stock exchange. When MCX launched its Initial Public Offer in early 2012 in flat markets, it was over-subscribed by 50 times, because the business of running a stock exchange seemed so overwhelmingly attractive then.
Exchanges had a natural monopoly as traders usually flocked to the exchange that offers the most liquidity. It was seen as fast growing and highly profitable too. MCX’ revenues had grown at 46 per cent annually in the three years preceding the IPO. Its operating profit margins, like its peers NSE and BSE, stood at above 60 per cent. But recent events have shown that the exchange business has several imponderables too. Traded volume, the only metric that seems to decide the worth of an exchange, can vanish pretty quickly in adversity, taking valuations with it. A negative turn in the market, a new tax (for instance, Commodities Transaction Tax) or a run-in with the regulator can demolish volumes, trim profit margins and sharply level market valuations that hinge on them. The battering witnessed by the stocks of MCX and Financial Technologies in the last few days is proof enough of this.